Duke Robotics Seminar: Relaxing Integrity Requirements for Attack-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems
Friday, March 31, 2017
3:30 pm - 4:30 pm
We consider the problem of network-based attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle attacks, on standard state estimators in CPS. For these scenarios, existing results impose very strict requirements to ensure graceful control performance degradation. Thus, we study effects of sporadic integrity enforcement, such as message authentication, on system performance under stealthy attacks. We show that even with a low-level of sensor integrity guarantees, the attacker cannot introduce an unbounded state-estimation error while remaining stealthy. We present a design-time framework to derive safe integrity enforcement policies, and illustrate its use on automotive case studies. We show that even with integrity enforcement in 20% of the time-steps we can ensure satisfiable system operation for previously perfectly attackable systems.